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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is appropriate in this case pursuant to UCA §78A-4-103. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On or about August 17, 2006 a judgment was entered in favor of Alan J. Prince 
against Rosalind Cazares in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, case no. 05092074. R.74-76, R. 174-175. 
2. For value received, the judgment was assigned to Pamela Cosby by Alan J. 
Prince on or about August 29, 2007. R.79-80, R.1J5. 
3. In an effort to recover the judgment, Pamela Cosby caused a Writ of Execution 
and praecipe to be issued by the Third Judicial District Court, wherein all of 
Rosalind Cazares' interest in the Estate of Rosemary Cosby was attached and 
ordered to be sold. R.70, R.175. 
4. The Salt Lake County Sheriff served notice by leaving a copy of the same with 
Adrian Jefferson. R.71, R.175. 
5. Adrian Jefferson is the son of Rosalind Cazares. R,71, R.175. 
6. Jefferson claimed his mother did not live with him and alleged that therefore 
service on him was not proper. R.71, R.175. 
7. A new praecipe and writ were executed and issued by the court and then 
served by Constable Sindt. R.71, R.175. 
8. Constable Sindt set the property for sale. R.71, R.175 
9. On the morning of the sale, Rosalind Cazares filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy, 
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without all of the necessary statements and schedules, (case # 08-21504) R.71, 
R.175. 
10. On April 24, 2008, Pamela Cosby filed a Motion for Relief from Automatic 
Stay which was scheduled for hearing on May 19, 2008. R.71, R.175. 
11. On April 30, 2008, an Order dismissing the case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 
521(i) was entered. R.71, R.175. 
12. Mrs. Cosby again set a sale for execution on her judgment. R.71, R.175. 
13. The Sale was scheduled for May 23, 2008. R.71, R.176. 
14. On the morning of May 23, 2008, Cazares again filed a Chapter 13 
Bankruptcy. R.71, R.176. 
15. Just as previously, Cazares filed the bankruptcy solely to delay the sale by Mrs. 
Cosby. R.71, R.176. 
16. Just as previously, the filing by the Debtors failed to meet the requirements of 
the Bankruptcy code. R.71, R.176. 
17. The sworn statements and schedules filed in the bankruptcy showed Cazares to 
be insolvent. R.71, R.176. 
18. On February 12, 2009 Cazares' bankruptcy was dismissed by the federal 
bankruptcy court for willfully failing to comply with the orders of the 
bankruptcy court. R.71-72, R.176. 
19. Mrs. Cosby again set the estate interest for sale on April 10, 2009. R.72, R.176. 
20. Fifteen minutes prior to the scheduled time for the sale, Adrian Jefferson 
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appeared at the constable's office. R.72, R.92, R.176. 
21. Jefferson is the son of Cazares. R.72, R.176. 
22. Jefferson was aware that Cazares had been in bankruptcy and that she was 
insolvent. R.72, R.176. 
23. Jefferson presented a document entitled Assignment to the constable and 
claimed that pursuant to the assignment he was the owner of the property R.92, 
R.176. 
24. Jefferson also threatened to sue the constable if he proceeded with the sale. 
R.92-93, R.176. 
25. In spite of Jefferson's threats the constable proceeded with the sale and Mrs 
Cosby was the successful bidder for the sum of $5,000.00. R.93, R.176. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff brought this action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of an interest in 
the Estate of Rosemary Cosby from Rosalind Cazares to her son Adrian Jefferson. In her 
memorandum filed in support of her motion for summary judgment the Ms. Cosby set 
forth 25 undisputed facts. The Defendants did not dispute any of these facts. When a 
party opposes a properly supported motion for summary judgment and fails to file any 
responsive affidavits or other evidentiary materials the trial court may properly conclude 
that there are no disputed issues of material fact. Walter v. Stewart, 67 P.3d 1042 (Utah 
2003). The Trial Court did deem the facts admitted and Defendants have not appealed 
those findings. 
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In their responsive pleadings, the Defendants likewise did not challenge the legal 
argument that the transfer from Cazares to Jefferson was a fraudulent conveyance. The 
Trial Court found as a matter of law that the conveyance was fraudulent. The Defendants 
have not appealed that Finding. 
Defendants' sole argument, on appeal, is that the execution and sale to Pamela 
Cosby is somehow invalid. To support this claim, the Defendants first claim that an 
interest in an estate cannot be executed on. Defendants cite no Utah authority that 
supports their position. In fact, Utah authority is completely to the contrary. A vested 
estate interest is a chose in action. Under Utah law a chose in action may be executed on 
by a creditor. In this case the estate interest of Rosalind Cazares had become fully vested 
upon the death of her mother and the lapse of the period of time for disclaimer. Both 
conditions had been fully met in this case. Indeed Ms. Cazares5 interest in the estate had 
been determined by an order of the Probate Court. 
Finally, the Defendants' argue that allowing Ms. Cosby to execute on Cazares' 
interest in the estate is against public policy. Utah law however is directly to the contrary. 
Defendants have waived any argument with respect to the determination of the facts in 
this case. Neither the Facts nor the Law support the issues raised by Defendants on 
Appeal and accordingly the Appeal should be denied. 
ARGUMENT 
I. AN INTEREST IN AN ESTATE MAY BE EXECUTED ON. 
The Defendants first argument is that an heir's interest in an estate is not subject to 
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execution and sale. In the case of Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 
P.2d 208 (Utah 1999) the Utah Supreme Court was asked to decide the issue of 
whether a legal malpractice claim could be reached through execution. In deciding the 
question the court addressed whether a chose in action could be executed on. The 
Court stated: 
Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a sheriff shall "execute the 
writ [of execution] against the non-exempt property of the judgment debtor by 
levying on a sufficient amount of property, if there is sufficient property; collecting 
or selling the choses in action and selling the other property in the manner set forth 
herein." Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f). A "chose in action" has been defined as "a claim or 
debt upon which a recovery may be made in a lawsuit. It is not a present 
possession, but merely a right to sue; it becomes a 'possessory thing1 only upon 
successful completion of a lawsuit." Barron's Law Dictionary 71 (3d ed.1991). 
Accordingly, we hold that a legal malpractice claim, like any other chose in action, 
may ordinarily be acquired by a creditor through attachment and execution. 
While this is a question of first impression in Utah, we note that a number of states 
permit a "judgment creditor to execute upon a judgment debtor's cause of action 
against its insurer." Denham v. Farmers Ins. Co., 213 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1070, 262 
Cal.Rptr. 146, 151 (Ct.App.1989) (referencing Bergen v. F/VSt. Patrick, 686 
F.Supp. 786 (D.Alaska 1988); Whitehead v. VanLeuven, 347 F.Supp. 505 (D.Idaho 
1972); Steffens v. American Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 181 N.W.2d 174 (Iowa 
1970)). Medical malpractice claims, for example, have been held to be subject to 
attachment and execution by creditors. Woody's Olympia Lumber, Inc. v. Roney, 9 
Wash.App. 626, 513 P.2d 849, 850-54 (1973). The Denham court interpreting 
Nevada law, held that, absent direct language to the contrary, all causes of action 
are subject to execution. See Denham, 262 Cal.Rptr. at 152. Like Nevada, Utah's 
rules of civil procedure contain no direct language exempting causes of action from 
execution.(fnl) See Utah R. Civ. P. 69. Rather, as the court of appeals noted, the 
term "chose in action" is used "in the Utah version of Rule 69 without restriction of 
any sort." Tanassee, 929 P.2d at 354. Thus, we view rule 69 to encompass all 
choses in action, including causes of action for legal malpractice 
Snow at 210. 
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court, all choses in action are subject to execution. 
5 
"A chose in action has been defined as a claim or debt upon which a recovery may be 
made in a lawsuit." Supra. The item that was executed on was all of Rosalind Cazares5 
rights in The Estate of Rosemary Cosby which were the subject of a law suit then pending 
in front of the Hon. Lee A. Dever.Civ. # 990902004. As such it was a chose in action and 
subject to execution. 
Defendants have claimed that the legal treatise of American Jurisprudence contains 
authority that stands for the prohibition of execution on estate interests. This is not true, 
but even if it were the Snow case is controlling authority in Utah not Am Jur. 
American Jurisprudence addresses the issue of execution on estate interests at 30 
Am. Jur. 2d §156. There it states: 
An heir or devisee, or legatee, who has a legal interest in realty which he or she 
may convey has an interest which may be subject to levy, under execution to pay 
his or her debts. More over, and although there is authority to the contrary it is not 
necessary that the personal representative of the estate has fully closed up the 
administration of the estate in order to render the interest of the heir subject to 
execution. 
Until a legacy vests in the legatee it cannot be taken on execution against the 
legatee. 
Contrary to the representation of the Defendants, Am Jur clearly states that an 
execution may be made on an estate interest. Am Jur fs only suggested prohibition is that 
such an interest cannot be taken prior to the interest vesting. Rosalind Cazares' interest 
vested upon the death of her mother, and the lapse of the period for disclaimer. UCA §75-
2-801 provides that a disclaimer of interest must be made within nine months after the 
death of the deceased owner. In the probate litigation the judge had already issued an 
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order determining heirs. Since Cazares was fully vested at the time of the execution the 
execution was valid. 
Cazares herself recognized the validity of her vesting in that she sold a portion of 
her interest by voluntary conveyance to an inheritance funding company. Subsequently 
she tried to divest herself of her remainder interest through the fraudulent conveyance to 
her son. By her own sworn statement she represented she was the owner of the estate. 
She should not be allowed to flip flop her position on her ownership interest as a matter of 
convenience to defraud her creditors. 
II. EXECUTION ON A CHOSE IN ACTION IS NOT AGAINST PUBLIC 
POLICY. 
The Defendants next argue that the execution must be set aside as being against 
public policy. As support for that position they cite to the case of Snow v. Tannasse, 929 
P.2d 351 (Utah App. 1999). This case was the lower court decision to the Supreme Court 
case cited by Plaintiff above. 
In the Supreme Court decision they made it clear that the public policy 
consideration is only in relation to malpractice actions between a lawyer and his or her 
clients. Snow at 212. 
This position was further clarified by the Supreme Court in the case of Applied 
Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Eames, 44 P.3d 699 (Utah 2002). There the Court stated: 
Heritage Trust also contends that Dr. Hill improperly purchased Heritage Trust's 
claims filed against Dr. Hill and others in the consolidated case because f![p]ublic 
[pjolicy dictates that a person [should] not be able to acquire a chose in action 
against itself by means of writ of execution or other forced sale." In making this 
argument, Heritage Trust relies upon Tanasse, in which, indeed, this court held as a 
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matter of public policy that a law firm could not purchase a legal malpractice claim 
pending against the law firm at a sheriffs sale. See 1999 UT 49 at 1ffll2--l3, 980 
P.2d 208. However, while we stated in Tanasse that public policy concerns 
included both the effect of denying the plaintiff the right to a trial on his claims and 
the preclusion of a fair valuation of those claims, we clearly stated that additional 
public policy concerns were present when dealing with lawyers. We explained: 
We recognize that both of the above-described problems are present in every 
situation in which a judgment creditor seeks to execute on an action pending 
against it. However, in situations like the present, in which the attorney-client 
relationship is at issue, these problems take on special significance. Allowing 
lawyers and law firms to execute on legal malpractice actions pending against them 
may significantly undermine the public trust in the legal profession and process and 
compromise the relationship. 
Id. at Ifl5. 
TJ20 Lawyers, as attorneys and counselors at law, are officers of the courts of this 
state and take a special oath subjecting them to the Rules of Professional Conduct 
promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct preamble; see 
also Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 2001 UT 86, f 34, 34 P.3d 194. Because of their 
legal training and experience, lawyers are in an advantageous position that enables 
them to appraise the merits of a claim, the amount of damages that they could 
incur, and the duration of potential litigation. Lawyers often know confidential 
information regarding former clients, such as their former clients' weaknesses and 
financial conditions. All of the foregoing places a lawyer in a position to take 
advantage of a client if the lawyer were allowed to purchase that client's 
malpractice claim against the lawyer and then move for dismissal of the claim. See 
Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 172, 369 P.2d 933, 936 (1962) (stating that 
attorneys are "not permitted to take advantage of [their] position[s] or superior 
knowledge"); see also In re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 342, 130 P. 217, 240-41 (1913) 
(recognizing that attorneys have legal technical knowledge that general public 
lacks). Thus, we concluded in Tanasse that "public confidence in both the legal 
profession and the legal process as a whole would be damaged if lawyers were 
allowed to execute on legal malpractice claims brought against them." 1999 UT 49 
at ^fl6. Therefore, in that case, pursuant to our constitutional duty to regulate and 
supervise the actions of attorneys in the practice of law, see Utah Const, art. VIII, § 
4, we determined that such public policy considerations were sufficient bases to 
hold that attorneys and law firms could not purchase legal malpractice claims 
against themselves with the intention of extinguishing those claims. Tanasse, 1999 
UT49atffi[12, 18. 
Tf21 Heritage Trust now urges us to extend the Tanasse exception to bar Dr. Hill 
from purchasing claims against himself. The claims that Dr. Hill purchased were 
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stock claims. Neither party has alleged that the agreement between Dr. Hill and Mr. 
Eames regarding the formation of Applied Medical and the disbursement and 
allocation of shares in Applied Medical was anything but an arm's-length business 
transaction. This is simply a case of a nonlawyer, Dr. Hill, purchasing claims 
against himself at a sheriffs sale. Unlike our holding in Tcmasse, which we based 
on the public policy of protecting the integrity of the legal process, 1999 UT 49 at 
ffl|15 16, here, where neither the attorney-client relationship nor the legal process is 
sullied or damaged and there are no other policy reasons to extend the exception to 
the general rule we articulated in Tanasse, we are reluctant to hold that nonlawyers 
may not purchase claims against them solely on the basis of public policy not 
derived from constitutional or statutory law. Therefore, we decline to enlarge the 
exception recognized in Tanasse. 
While the Eames case clearly puts to rest the public policy argument, it should be 
pointed out that in this case the chose being acquired is not even an action against Mrs. 
Cosby. Accordingly the public policy concerns are inapplicable here. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants failed to object to any of the facts or the legal argument establishing 
that the transfer from Cazares to Jefferson was a fraudulent transfer. Instead they argue 
only that as a matter of law and public policy the interest in the estate could not be 
executed on. As clearly defined by the Utah Supreme Court neither of these positions has 
any merit and Ms. Cosby therefore respectfully requests that Defendants' appeal be 
denied. 
Dated this Af day of July, 2010 
Shawn D. Turner 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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